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Background
It is my pleasure to discuss the 1982 amendments to the 
California workers' compensation law. The planning com 
mittee has asked that I summarize those changes and 
describe why the law was amended, the short term results of 
the legislated changes, and the potential long-range conse 
quences of that action.
It is inappropriate, however, to characterize the 1982 
legislative changes in California as "reform," the central 
theme of this conference. There were changes in the Califor 
nia law—indeed, massive changes—but with minor excep 
tions, the 1982 amendments did little to make the California 
compensation program more equitable, effective, or effi 
cient. Instead, my remarks might more properly be labeled, 
"The Political Realities of Workers' Compensation 
Reform," an object lesson in what happens when employees 
and employers abrogate their responsibility to participate in 
the establishment of public policy in the workers' compensa 
tion arena.
By way of background, the California law extends to 
about 600,000 employers employing 11 million covered
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workers. Compensable injuries approximate 1.3 million an 
nually, of which 375,000 are "disabling," i.e., one or more 
days lost time, and of that latter number perhaps 70,000 
work injuries result in permanent residual impairment. The 
state agency's role has been essentially passive, in large part 
limited to adjudication after a dispute has developed, and 
the bulk of its $30 million-plus budget pays for 120 referee 
teams resident in 23 offices throughout the state. Given this 
emphasis, litigation is pervasive in the California workers' 
compensation system, marked by a high degree of involve 
ment by attorneys and forensic physicians.
California Workers' Compensation Institute research 
studies establish that the costs of workers' compensation 
litigation in California exceeded $350 million in 1981. That 
total includes attorneys' fees for employee and employer, ex 
penses of medical testimony and other direct out-of-pocket 
costs incident to the litigation, but excludes benefits paid to 
workers. My purpose in mentioning this is to underscore the 
interests of other players when workers' compensation 
reform is considered, and the difficulty in making any 
changes that are perceived to affect these interests.
The 1982 Amendments
The 1982 amendments to the California workers' compen 
sation law were the first substantive changes in 10 years. 
There had been some procedural modifications during this 
period, but attempts at major revision were frustrated by the 
balance of power among the special interest groups. The 
practical effect was that organized labor's drive for higher 
benefits could be stalled by the employer lobby unless labor 
accepted the employers' demand for a quid pro quo, which 
labor was unwilling to do. Similarly, changes sought by the 
employer community were not possible without including a 
substantial benefit package, and the dominant employer
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groups thought the price too high. Both labor and manage 
ment had veto power and exercised it.
The balance shifted in 1982, due more to the entry of some 
additional players, specifically, the trial bar, than any 
change in political power, and the result was enactment of a 
workers' compensation benefit-reform package. The most 
visible feature of the package is a sharp increase in benefits. 
Over a two-year period, benefit levels will rise $660 million, 
while costs to employers will increase by nearly $1 billion. 
That represents the largest benefit increase in California 
history, if not the largest benefit increase in the history of 
workers' compensation.
I have no particular problem with the size of the benefit in 
crease, but I do have concerns with its distribution. More 
than 90 percent of the new benefit dollars will increase in 
demnity levels for permanent partial disability—the benefit 
sector most fraught with litigation and, accordingly, most 
fruitful for trial attorneys and forensic doctors—while leav 
ing maximum weekly benefits for total disability, both tem 
porary and permanent, woefully inadequate (i.e., less than 
60 percent of the statewide average wage). The 1982 benefit 
increases magnify the maldistribution of California workers' 
compensation benefits, a maldistribution I feel confident in 
predicting will require wrenching change within the current 
decade.
The reform part of the package—the quid pro quo for the 
employer community—included enactment of a provision re 
quiring factual issues in litigated claims to be determined by 
a preponderance of the evidence. Trial judges and the ap 
pellate courts over time had accepted the liberal construction 
imperative too literally in the view of many employer 
observers, and this change was an attempt to restore balance. 
The law still must be construed liberally, but the facts must 
be determined by a preponderance of evidence.
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Second, the legislation provided a statute of limitations on 
the vocational rehabilitation benefit. In 1974 California 
became the first state to adopt mandatory vocational 
rehabilitation as part of its workers' compensation law. The 
1974 enactment, however, was something less than a 
paragon of clarity, and there was a substantial question as to 
whether the benefit was open-ended or had to be exercised 
within a specific period of time after the injury. The benefit- 
reform package opted for certainty.
The most important of the reform elements was a buttress 
ing of the exclusive remedy doctrine. A series of court deci 
sions held that the employment relationship did not shield an 
employer from civil liability if the employee's injury was at 
tributable to the employer's other "capacity," e.g., as a 
manufacturer. Thus, a California employee injured in the 
course of employment by a defective product produced by 
the employer was entitled to workers' compensation benefits 
and, additionally, could bring a civil action for damages 
against the employer as a manufacturer. The 1982 legislation 
overturned these holdings, restoring the reciprocal conces 
sions of employees and employers to their original 
balance—and, according to one estimate, saving employers 
$1 billion in additional costs over the next five years.
That in general was the package. It resulted from the in 
terplay of a number of factors:
• No significant benefit increases in 10 years;
• A series of adverse appellate decisions;
• The growing political influence of the trial bar;
• The decline in the legislative muscle of the employer 
community and, to a lesser degree, statewide labor;
• Sharp differences in the priorities of the principal 
players and an inability to resolve the differences.
It was an interesting exercise in pragmatic politics, albeit one 
which requires looking backward.
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The Politics of Workers' Compensation
In 1971, the dominant employer organization and the in 
surance industry were instrumental in negotiating a signifi 
cant revision to the California workers' compensation 
system through an "agreed bill" that granted substantial 
benefit increases in exchange for major concessions by 
organized labor. Five years later, in 1976, another modest 
reform package was enacted, but this time the negotiating 
parties were limited to organized labor and the insurance in 
dustry. No employer group was actively involved in the ef 
fort—not because employers didn't have a stake, but mainly 
because of a collective inability to agree upon any pressing 
reforms in exchange for increased benefit levels.
What had happened in that five-year period? At the risk of 
oversimplifying, the major change was the end of involve 
ment by chief executive officers and other senior manage 
ment types representing employers. For whatever reason, 
responsibility for social insurance issues was transferred to 
middle level managers and, ultimately, the entire subject was 
left in the hands of the institutional employer organizations. 
At the same time employers who had been legislatively active 
(and their trade associations) lost their senior professional 
lobbyists to death and retirement and thus lost their input to 
legislative leaders.
Organized labor's role also underwent a change with the 
legislative emergence of local unions. Many of the locals 
relied heavily upon the advice of local compensation 
claimants' attorneys whose interests, vis-a-vis labor's, were 
not always consonant in workers' compensation issues. 
Statewide labor was still a force, but its positions were in 
creasingly muted or neutralized by what local unions were 
telling legislators.
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Some indication of the shifting in relative strength came in 
1977 when the insurance industry secured passage of con 
troversial legislation that altered the allocation of liability 
among multiple defendants in cumulative injury and occupa 
tional disease claims over the combined opposition of the 
employer community and organized labor. The key to its 
enactment may have been that the economic interests of the 
trial bar were unaffected.
By the 1980 session, the employer community had become 
inflexible. In theory, employers continued to adhere to the 
strategy of no benefit increases without commensurate 
reform. In reality, however, they had become entrenched 
around a policy of no change whatsoever. So the insurance 
industry and statewide labor, with the governor's office as 
marriage broker, began discussions leading to a major 
overhaul of the compensation system. The package included 
substantial benefit increases (totaling only about half the 
cost of the 1982 bill) in exchange for building more certainty 
and objectivity into the determination of permanent partial 
disability, and thereby sharply curtailed the system's 
dependence upon lawyers and forensic doctors. It was a 
game but unsuccessful effort because the trial bar, working 
through local union officials, was able to present the ap 
pearance of a divided labor camp; because employers were 
unwilling to pay higher benefits; and because of the 
unreconstructed egos of some of the parties.
Nevertheless, the pressure continued to build. The courts 
began to respond to benefit inadequacy through a series of 
decisions eroding the exclusivity of workers' compensation. 
During the 1981 legislative session, the employer and insurer 
lobby introduced a measure to restrict the courts' expanded 
definition of the "dual capacity" doctrine. It passed the 
Senate, but the Assembly Speaker would not permit its 
passage without a large increase in benefits, a price
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employers were unwilling to pay. In November, after the ses 
sion recessed, the Supreme Court handed down its decision 
in Bell vs. Industrial Vangas, 30 Cal 3d 268, which 
transmuted dual capacity into double jeopardy for 
employers.
As the 1982 session opened, the real parties weren't talk 
ing. Organized labor refused to consider an amendment to 
the dual capacity issue "because that's not a comp issue." 
Employers were reluctant to negotiate with labor without 
dual capacity being considered, and were unwilling to 
negotiate directly with the trial bar because of the magnitude 
of the benefit increases being advanced. That left the in 
surance industry and the trial bar as the only players with an 
ostensible community of interest, so their discussions began.
Originally the insurer representatives functioned as sur 
rogates for the employer groups, keeping them informed of 
developments while attempting to convince them of the need 
for movement, given the Assembly Speaker's commitment to 
pass a benefit bill—with or without other reforms. Over 
time, however, the insurer-employer relationship broke 
down because of a series of economic decisions made by the 
employer association:
• First, a decision not to support the permanent partial 
disability reforms proposed by the insurance industry 
(and bitterly resisted by the trial bar) because the ex 
pected savings couldn't be quantified. Throughout, the 
thinking seemed to be, "If benefits are increased by X 
million dollars, we need Y million back in reforms."
• Second, a decision to forego legislative repeal of the 
dual capacity doctrine and wait until the next session 
when the political climate might be more favorable, a 
wistful vision that never came to pass. This approach 
conflicted with the priorities of compensation insurers 
which felt, I think correctly, that the real reason for
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backing off was the high price tag associated with dual 
capacity repeal.
• And, finally, the employer trade associations were 
limited in the amount to be included in the benefit 
package. They couldn't make the ante. And in politics, 
as in poker, the rules dictate that when you fold your 
hand, you don't get any more cards.
With employers dropping out of the game, a series of 
amendments were drafted by the remaining principals, incor 
porated into an Assembly-passed bill in the Senate, and 
enacted into law within two weeks after surfacing.
The Impact of the Amendments
The immediate results—good news or bad news, depen 
ding upon your perspective—include containment of the 
dual capacity doctrine and removal of a threat to the legal 
underpinnings of the workers' compensation system, a 
change that will result in significant savings in loss and legal 
costs. The limitation on the vocational rehabilitation benefit 
similarly will save some unnecessary expense and permit in 
surers and employers to close files. Binding the trier of fact 
to a preponderance of evidence test has the potential to make 
workers' compensation more professional by introducing a 
standard of judicial objectivity where one didn't exist 
before. And the upgrading of disability benefits may con 
vince the civil courts that it isn't necessary to create legal fic 
tions to accomplish substantial justice for injured workers.
On the other hand, California employers are faced with 
escalating costs, upwards of 30 percent, without any mean 
ingful substantive change in the workers' compensation law. 
More litigation, fueled by higher benefit levels, can be ex 
pected. Minimum weekly benefits were adjusted dramatical 
ly and the result may be longer periods of disability for the
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low wage earner. Moreover, the higher benefits may signal a 
change in benefit utilization and an acceleration in the asser 
tion of so-called "stress" claims once the economic recovery 
is achieved.
The long term consequences of the 1982 legislation are 
more difficult to divine. All I can do is speculate, but I 
believe there will be at least two observable effects—or 
noneffects, as the case may be.
• First, no real changes in the California workers' com 
pensation system in the immediate future, despite the 
extant inequities, leakages and waste. Legislators have 
an excuse—"we dealt with comp last year"—and many 
find compensation legislation politically unattractive. 
Absent an agreed bill, comp is a "bad" vote for one or 
more of a legislator's constituencies. Legislators 
generally would prefer to avoid the issue unless they're 
pushed, and there's no one pushing them—which brings 
me to my second, equally dour projection.
• There will be no meaningful changes until the real 
stakeholders—organized labor and employers—initiate 
the movement.
Organized labor, in many instances, has permitted its role 
to be co-opted by attorneys. The complexities of workers' 
compensation are little understood by labor leaders, par 
ticularly at the local union level, and there is a tendency in 
what appears to be a highly legalistic system to yield to the 
"expert," that is, a lawyer. The interests of organized labor 
in workers' compensation legislation are not always conso 
nant with the interests of claimants' attorneys, protestations 
of the latter to the contrary notwithstanding. Unfortunately, 
the dichotomy hasn't been recognized, much less 
acknowledged.
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The other factor in the formula, the employer community, 
is at least as troubling. Today employers complain about be 
ing frozen out of the legislative negotiations, but the truth is 
that they voluntarily isolated themselves. Unless they 
demonstrate a willingness to participate in the political arena 
where the workers' compensation policy decisions are made, 
the legislative decisions will continue to be dictated by the 
scorekeepers and linesmen.
Conclusion
Obviously, my remarks are pertinent only to California. I 
suggest, however, that the 1982 experience in California may 
have application to other jurisdictions, and the differences 
are more of degree than substance.
If there is a lesson, it is that workers' compensation is a 
statutory creature. Changes, no matter how well-reasoned 
and researched, cannot be accomplished in academe, by 
studies, or by the imprimatur of blue ribbon commissions. 
Real change requires legislative action in a political environ 
ment. Until that lesson is accepted, reform—that is, im 
provement—of the workers' compensation system cannot be 
realized.
